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*I.P.Q. 259 In 2011, we are celebrating 20 years of EU copyright harmonisation. However, in contrast
to most other intellectual property rights, which are now both harmonised and unified, copyright
harmonisation is unfinished business and unification has not yet commenced. The new decade may
augur changes in this respect. While, the Commission hinted at unification in the field of intellectual
property (art.118) and some academics think this is the next step forward (Wittem Code 2010). This
article takes stock and weighs the pros and cons of future EU legislative action both as to its form and
content.
Introduction
This year marks the 20th anniversary of the adoption of the first Directive in the field of copyright1 .
However, while trademark, designs and plant variety rights are all almost fully both harmonised and
unified,2 copyright is still not.3 Yet, the next decade may see a wind of change. In October 2009, the
Commission4 issued a paper in which it seriously considers a Regulation as a possible way forward in
the field of copyright.5 The new Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)6 now
includes an article giving specific competence for unification in the field of intellectual property (art.
118) and in April 2010, the Wittem project for a European copyright code, an academic proposal, was
published.7 In the light of these developments, it is time to take stock and envisage whether
unification and codification are indeed the way forward. We first examine the form any future EU
legislative initiative in the field of copyright should take and then its content.
*I.P.Q. 260 The form
There are four options: unifying (through a Regulation), further harmonising (through Directives),
guiding (through Recommendations) or do nothing. We envisage them in turn.
A unitary copyright system
The Commission Paper “Creative Content in a European Digital Single Market: Challenges for the
Future -- A Reflection Document of DG INFSO and DG MARKT” has, in its discussion of “Possible EU
Actions for a Single Market for Creative Content Online” floated in section 5.2 the prospect of a
unitary copyright system for Europe8 :
“In order to create a more coherent licensing framework at European level, some stakeholders are
suggesting a more profound harmonisation of copyright laws. A ‘European Copyright Law’
(established, e.g., by means of an EU regulation9 ) is often mooted as establishing a truly unified legal
framework that would lead to direct benefits for the coherence of online licensing. A Community
copyright title would have instant Community-wide effect, thereby creating a single market for
copyrights and related rights. It would overcome the issue that each national copyright law, though
harmonised as to its substantive scope, applies only in one particular national territory. A Community
copyright would enhance legal security and transparency, for right owners and users alike, and
greatly reduce transaction and licensing costs. Unification of EU copyright by regulation could also
restore the balance between rights and exceptions -- a balance that is currently skewed by the fact
that the harmonisation directives mandate basic economic rights, but merely permit certain
exceptions and limitations. A regulation could provide that rights and exceptions are afforded the
same degree of harmonisation. By creating a single European copyright title, European Copyright
Law would create a tool for streamlining rights management across the Single Market, doing away
with the necessity of administering a ‘bundle’ of 27 national copyrights. Such a title, especially if
construed as taking precedence over national titles, would remove the inherent territoriality with
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respect to applicable national copyright rules; a softer approach would be to make such a Community
copyright title an option for rightholders which would not replace, but exist in parallel to national
copyright titles. Naturally, the existence of such a title would raise important issues for the
organisation of rights management. A recent report analysed the impact that the introduction of a
Community title for copyright would have on current rights management practices.10 Further reflection
on the future of European rights management would therefore have to precede the introduction of a
Community copyright title.”
*I.P.Q. 261 In saying that such a proposal has been “often mooted”, the Commission may have been
rather overstating matters, as it is hard to find much in the literature by way of discussion of a unitary
copyright system, whether by way of specific proposals as to what such a system would look like, or,
and perhaps more important and certainly more difficult, a road map as to how we might get to there
from where we are now.11
It should be emphasised that what the “Creative Content” paper suggests is a unitary copyright
system having effect throughout the EU, and not just greater harmonisation of national copyright
systems by yet further harmonisation beyond the existing acquis as established by the several
Directives that already serve to harmonise in the EU many aspects of the law of copyright and related
rights. It is implicit, however, in such a proposal for a unitary right that it would have to go hand in
hand with a much greater degree of harmonisation, of copyright law in the EU than exists at present,
if not total harmonisation.
Let us first explore what such process would entail, especially as the “Creative Content” paper is
opaque as to the relationship of the new unitary copyright system that it floats with the existing
national ones. Does it replace them, as this author, and as those commentators who have addressed
the issue, suggest would be necessary,12 or does it, as is suggested by the comments in the “Creative
Content” paper as to “[s]uch a title, especially if construed as taking precedence over national titles”
and “a softer approach would be to make such a Community copyright title an option for rightholders
which would not replace, but exist in parallel to national copyright titles”? And whether it is envisaged
that national copyright systems are replaced by the new regime, or continue to exist in some limited
way alongside it, what will happen to national copyrights that are already in existence when the new
regime comes into force and which have the potential to continue in existence for another 100 years
or so?
At a superficial level, it is easy to suggest that there is no fundamental problem with establishing a
unitary system of copyright for the EU because we already have several intellectual property rights of
a unitary nature in the EU13 and the passage of the Lisbon Treaty has provided, in TFEU art.118, a
new legal basis for establishing these.14 However, just because there is now a more solid legal basis
for such systems than that which existed before and assuming that establishing a unitary system of
copyright is considered to be desirable,15 establishing copyright as a unitary EU right presents certain
unique problems. These are problems that have not been faced in establishing other unitary
intellectual property regimes in Europe.
*I.P.Q. 262 First, all of these other unitary regimes, with the exception of the very short in duration
(three years) unregistered design right, establish registered intellectual property rights, so the rights in
issue do not, unlike copyright, come automatically into existence, but need to be applied for.
Secondly, these other unitary regimes all exist in parallel with, and not in replacement for, existing
national regimes, which have to large extent (with the exception of the plant variety rights and
unregistered design right) also been harmonised with the corresponding unitary rights.16 This allows
users of these systems a choice of the right that they apply for, and allows them, albeit at a cost
which limits the extent to which they avail themselves of the possibility, to seek to register both types
of right. Whether in fact such a potential multiplicity of cumulative rights, and the legislative thicket
that underpins it, is in fact desirable from the point of view of EU society at large is not an issue that
has, so far, apparently troubled the EU legislature. However, the cost to the potential right holder with
registered intellectual property rights of availing itself of the possibilities for multiple rights that this
situation offers does at least provide some measure of practical control over the extent to which any
particular right exists in parallel.
In contrast, and despite what the Commission says in its “Creative Content” paper about parallel
systems, it is hard to envisage how a unitary EU copyright could subsist in parallel with national
copyrights, with the two rights coming into effect simultaneously and in parallel every time a new work
is created and then enduring for life plus 70 years.17 Although the Berne Convention does not seem to
envisage it for copyright, such a situation does currently exist under the Paris Convention for the EU
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and its Member States in relation to designs and trade marks, so it seems unlikely that Berne
precludes it. However, if two types of copyright were to co-exist in the EU in parallel then, unless the
establishment of a unitary right were to be accompanied by the corresponding degree of
harmonisation of national rights, many of the aims behind introducing a unitary right would be wholly
frustrated. Moreover, harmonisation of national rights would do nothing to address the Commission's
main aim in proposing a unitary right, namely to overcome the inherent territoriality of national rights.
So it would seem most likely that, and in contrast to the existing unitary intellectual property regimes,
a unitary EU copyright regime would have to be introduced as a replacement for, rather than an
addition to, national copyrights in EU Member States.
But replacing an existing intellectual property regime is not easy, especially where the intellectual
property right involved is one that is as long-lived as copyright. As Hugenholtz has observed, the
“introduction of [an EU] copyright would of course pose challenges in terms of enacting adequate
transitional law”.18 Even if national copyright systems are to be wholly supplanted by the new unitary
EU copyright regime for new works, such national regimes will, on the face of matters, have to remain
in existence for already subsisting national copyrights in old works, and in most cases for more than
hundred years afterwards. Thus Hugenholtz's observation is something of an understatement,
especially when one considers that EU intellectual property harmonisation in the past has in general
avoided the need for transitional measures by increasing protection19 or adding new protection.
Certainly such measures have been careful to preserve existing rights, even where the underlying
basis of protection has been restricted in scope for the future.20
*I.P.Q. 263 Even were the new unitary right to replace national rights going forward, any approach
which did not however radically cut back on the scope to which already existing national rights could
be asserted inconsistently with the new unitary right would undermine the Commission's main aim
behind introducing a new unitary copyright--addressing the issue of territoriality. Moreover, any
approach that was limited to copyright and did not also address the territorial nature of related rights
would also fail in such an aim.
Despite the problems highlighted above, there are a great number of advantages in unifying copyright
rather than harmonising it further or simply guiding its course.21 Of course, as highlighted above, it
assumes that the Regulation would replace national rights and adopt appropriate transitional
measures. In addition, it should also deal with the issue of applicable law insofar as it does not
establish its own such law.22 First of all, evidently, the idea of adopting a Regulation is not to have a
copyright code for the sake of a code, otherwise it is simply an academic exercise. Therefore it may
well have to remain at first incomplete while simultaneously striving to be as comprehensive as
possible. A Regulation will at the same time reduce a great many types of costs as well as legal
uncertainty and as the Commission paper mentions it, increase transparency.23 Transaction and
licensing costs for copyright holders and copyright users will dramatically decrease as copyright law
will be the same in all 27 Member States.24 In this respect, a Regulation will also annihilate the current
application of the strictest national copyright law to contracts involving cross-border licensing.25 The
costs (mainly but not only parliamentary time and resources) for Member States to implement
Directives will disappear along with the costs incurred by the Commission to sue Member States not
complying with the Directives. Lobbying efforts will no longer need to be duplicated. Transparency will
be greater as all Member States will have only one copyright text providing exactly the same law in
the same words rather than 27 ones.
Legally speaking, a copyright Regulation is now a realistic prospect thanks to TFEU art.118.26 Article
118(1) provides:
“In the context of the establishment and functioning of the internal market, the European Parliament
and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall establish
measures for the creation of European intellectual property rights to provide uniform protection of
intellectual property rights throughout the Union and for the setting up of centralised Union-wide
authorisation, coordination and supervision arrangements.”27
Before the Treaty's amendment, it was necessary to reach unanimity to adopt a Regulation. With the
new art.118, this is a thing of the past as qualified majority is now the rule (the ordinary legislative
procedure requires only qualified majority). A Regulation is therefore a much easier and thus much
more possible option in the field of copyright law than ever before. In fact, it is permissible to think that
the Union is even obliged to adopt such a Regulation, at least if adopting such a copyright Regulation
is necessary for *I.P.Q. 264 the functioning of the internal market, as the article uses the term “shall”.
There is already strong evidence that this is the case because the Directives were taken on that basis
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and there remain issues, both harmonised and unharmonised,28 which affect the smooth functioning
of the internal market. There is another strong reason for adopting a Regulation in the field of
copyright. Because of its fragmented copyright law, the EU is weak at the international negotiating
table.29 Obviously, the most difficult hurdle in adopting a Regulation, let alone a complete codification,
will be political.30
Further copyright harmonisation
If a Regulation is not enacted, the next best alternative is to carry on adopting Directives. As we have
mentioned above, doing so has the disadvantages of costly and slow implementation, with the added
problems of poor transparency and legal certainty.31 Furthermore, contrary to a Regulation, Directives
will not solve the territoriality issue.32 The Directives would also need to have as few options as
possible for Member States so as not to hamper the harmonisation goal.33
Further harmonisation can also happen without legislative input. Such indirect harmonisation can be
achieved by the EU courts and also by national courts following each other's decisions if they are
willing and able to do so.34 In fact, we should soon have massive harmonisation thanks to a high
number of references lodged in 2009 and 2010, many on vital copyright law points. While this is
welcome, this “do nothing” approach is the most minimalist and probably the least satisfactory in
terms of cost and legal certainty. Indeed, one needs to wait for litigation to occur and for the
willingness of national courts to refer questions. Until then, the law is unclear and it is costly for those
litigating. It is also in some way discriminatory because private parties bear the cost which should be
borne by all. In addition, this indirect or a posteriori harmonisation will happen in any case. EU courts
will still play a role in the further harmonisation or unification through the interpretation of existing
Directives, and of any potential Regulation, not only to clarify concepts but also to correct the
imbalances.35
Finally, further harmonisation can also be achieved via Recommendations. Recommendations may
be better than the “do nothing” approach but they remain soft law and are good only as a first step, as
they are non binding. Their harmonisation is therefore all but random. This is not to say that the
Commission should not carry on issuing Recommendations. They serve a useful purpose in the
meantime until a Regulation is adopted.
*I.P.Q. 265 The content
The issue of content necessitates asking two questions. What do we and what may we include in the
code? The latter question refers to the limited competence of the EU. Because the EU's competence
in the field of intellectual property law is not exclusive, the principles of proportionality and of
subsidiarity apply.36 According to the subsidiarity principle, “the Union should not intrude on national,
regional and local political and cultural identities”.37 In addition, the question is also one of
“comparative efficiency, namely could the measure be more effectively resolved by central rather than
local legislation”.38 One single measure may well enable economies of scale and minimise disruptions
caused by different laws.39 Even if the subsidiarity principle has been frequently invoked before the
EU courts, the latter have not yet annulled a measure based on a breach of it.40 In the field of
intellectual property, one will recall famously the failed attempt by the Netherlands to annul the
Biotech Directive41 for non-respect of the principle. The following paragraph of the decision may be
crucial insofar as it may well apply by analogy with a future copyright Regulation:
“The objective pursued by the Directive, to ensure smooth operation of the internal market by
preventing or eliminating differences between the legislation and practice of the various Member
States in the area of the protection of biotechnological inventions, could not be achieved by action
taken by the Member States alone. As the scope of that protection has immediate effects on trade,
and, accordingly, on intra-Community trade, it is clear that, given the scale and effects of the
proposed action, the objective in question could be better achieved by the Community.”42
Proportionality implies that the means employed are appropriate and necessary to the end sought. In
other words, it asks what the best type of regulatory instrument to realise a task is--EU or national?43
As with the subsidiarity principle, it is rare for the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) to
annul a measure for breach of the proportionality principle.44 In fact, the CJEU is not inclined to strike
down measures for breach of one or the two principles also because they are mainly of a political
nature.45
In view especially of the subsidiarity principle, it may already appear to the connoisseur that copyright
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law includes a few aspects which can well be thought to be preserving or embodying national or
cultural identity, because the common law and civil law systems differ quite a bit in the area of
copyright and related rights. One can readily think of the following as the last bastions of sovereignty
which many countries would not want to see touched: authorship and ownership, moral rights,
dealings, exceptions, accessorial and secondary liability, and fixation.46 Some commentators have
therefore suggested that on *I.P.Q. 266 grounds or proportionality and subsidiarity, total
harmonisation may be inappropriate.47 It should also be noted that the Commission's proposal in its
“Creative Content” paper is in response to one particular issue that troubles it--namely rights
management practices such as those for online licensing. The Commission does not, however, seem
to consider itself to be without remedies in such matters having already chosen to use EU competition
law to challenge certain territorially limited licensing practices.48 There may be other reasons why
many of these would be best regulated at national level, namely because many of these concepts are
not purely or even not at all copyright concepts but pertain to property, tort and contract laws, which
are not (yet) within EU competence.49 Nevertheless, as we shall see below when examining the
Wittem Code, some points, e.g. moral rights, cultural diversity can be preserved in a common text,
bridging the gap between the two traditions. The two principles should not therefore be seen as an
insurmountable obstacle to the adoption of a Regulation. In fact, a Regulation may now even be the
only possible instrument. This is because art.6 of the revised Protocol on Subsidiarity and
Proportionality requires that the Union's legislature chooses the instrument which minimises the
financial and administrative burden both of the Union and of the national and local authorities.50
The second question is: what do we include in the Regulation? The copyright harmonisation that has
taken place so far, despite being effected through several Directives, has only been of the “low
hanging fruit” of copyright harmonisation. This may well be reflected in the relatively few references
that there have been, until only recently, to the CJEU under these various Directives. It is certainly the
case that these Directives have left untouched, either at all or in large part, some fundamental and
difficult issues where there are clear differences between Member States. Not surprisingly, these
include many of the same aspects which may well be, according to the principles of subsidiarity and
proportionality, best regulated by the Member States:
• what can constitute a copyright work?51
• what copyright protection is available for works of applied art and industrial designs and models?52
• what level of originality must apply for copyright to subsist in a work?53
*I.P.Q. 267 • who is the author and who is the first owner of copyright in a work, in particular as
between an employee and his employer?54
• are there special laws that apply to copyright contracts, for example as to the degree to which
authors may renegotiate such contracts or the degree to which authors can waive moral rights in such
contracts?55
• what exceptions should apply, recognising that, except for copyright in computer programs, virtually
none of the exceptions as currently provided for in the EU acquis are mandatory?
• what approach should be taken to the variety of legal theories in the EU which address accessorial
liability--i.e. what, under English law, would be characterised as “joint tortfeasance”?56
• what types of copyright infringement attract criminal penalties, and what penalties should be levied
for such acts?57
These are only a few examples of important areas of copyright law where there is as yet no
harmonisation in the EU, or where the partial degree of the harmonisation that has been achieved to
date evidences the depth of the problems that face any attempt to harmonise further. Such
differences in “black letter” law are, however, only the “tip of the iceberg”. They mask fundamental
differences in approach between different national copyright systems in the EU, differences that are
all too apparent to anyone who analyses how the same, apparently harmonised, issue is in practice
addressed in these different national systems. It is time to now look at the Wittem Code, proposed by
copyright academics from both civil and common law traditions. What does the code include? The
first clear observation is that it is by far incomplete. It includes a preamble, and regulates the following
areas: subject-matter of protection, the idea/expression dichotomy and originality, authorship and
ownership, moral rights, economic rights and limitations. Therefore it does not include the public
lending right, legal protection of technological protection measures (TPMs), secondary liability, related
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rights including the database sui generis right or the relationship between on the one hand copyright
and on the other hand competition, unfair competition or contract laws. In the preamble, the authors
set out the principles that govern the code. In short, a code is needed for a functioning internal
market. The code bridges the gap between authors' right and copyright systems and also combines
the justifications for copyright from both civil and common laws (personality rights and incentive
theories). In addition, the preamble emphasises that copyright must reflect freedom of *I.P.Q. 268
expression and of competition and takes note of the international and EU acquis. It is not the place or
aim to offer here a comprehensive critique of the code.58 We will just flag a few of the good and less
good aspects of it.
On the plus side, it cannot be denied that, overall, the code is well thought through, clearly written and
precise. It has footnotes under the articles rather than recitals, which increases clarity. As to content,
the provisions on authorship and ownership are more advanced than under current harmonisation
and there are comprehensive moral rights provisions. In addition, both of these types of provisions
along with those on exceptions neatly bridge the gap between copyright and authors' rights systems.59
The exceptions are classed in five categories: (1) uses with minimal economic significance; (2) uses
for the purpose of freedom of expression and information; (3) uses permitted to promote social,
political and cultural objectives; (4) uses for the purpose of enhancing competition; and (5) the
three-step test but only in the sense that it allows new similar exceptions. This classification increases
clarity and allows differential treatment between exceptions, e.g. whether a remuneration is due or
not. The Wittem Code also shows that the double risk which a complete or near complete unification
of copyright entail, namely that of downward harmonisation (e.g. moral rights) and that of upward
harmonisation (e.g. term), can be reduced considerably.
On the minus side, the non-exhaustive list of works can obviously cause problems.60 Nothing is
provided for borderline creations which some Member States' courts would recognise as works while
some others would not. What should Member States do if such an issue is raised in litigation?
Arguably, it is impossible to have a complete list and the problem will always exist, in any country with
an open clause. However, the code could include a provision alongside this one stating that in case of
doubt, there is an obligation for the first ever court to be seised of such new matter, even if a first
instance one, to refer to the CJEU (or a potential future intellectual property court). Another point of
contention is the absence of any provision on technological measures and anti-circumvention
provisions except for one which regulates the relationship between them and exceptions (art.5.8).61
But then why is that relationship addressed but not that between exceptions and contracts which is
akin to it? There are, as mentioned above, a number of other gaps, but understandably they are due
to the group's limited resources.62 Indeed, the group was only composed of seven members, helped
by another eight members of its advisory board.
More disappointing is the fact that the Wittem group eschews taking a position on the desirability or
otherwise of introducing a unified framework for copyright as this position may diminish the code's
already only potential political impact.63 In sum, the group's proposals address and adopt agreed and
also remarkably elegant positions on many, but not all, of the difficult harmonisation issues listed
above, but that is not to suggest that such proposals would prove to be politically viable; indeed even
among themselves they have been unable to agree on the appropriate term of protection of economic
rights and of some moral rights. Nevertheless, despite its incompleteness, the code is a good starting
point for future EU legislation.
*I.P.Q. 269 Conclusion: towards “EU Copyright 2.0”?
On any basis, very much more work on harmonisation will be needed, either as preparatory to, or as
part of, any attempt to introduce a unitary EU copyright regime. Such work will make the hard work
done to date on harmonisation of copyright since the first Commission Green Paper in this area in
1988 look extremely easy by comparison. That is not to say that work on such a “grand projet” should
not be begun. But it should not start with the mindset of providing the “quick fix” for the issue of
territoriality in the EU that the Commission seems to be looking for in its “Creative Content” paper.
The need for transitional provisions as to already existing copyrights, and the status of related rights,
make it likely that it would take several generations to address the issue of territoriality by such
measures.
Moreover, the issue of territoriality is hardly likely to prove an aspirational motivation for such work in
the eyes of the sort of experts who should be involved with formulating with a unitary EU copyright
regime, if it is to be done properly. Indeed the Commission has already, for the short and medium
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term, chosen to fall back on its old standby, EU competition law, in seeking to deal with the issue of
territoriality, having apparently abandoned “country of origin” and exhaustion type approaches as apt
to address this in the context of cross border transmissions such as online services.64
Nonetheless, we think that a Regulation replacing national laws is the best way forward both in terms
of form and in terms of content. It may not, for the reasons given above, be possible to achieve a
complete copyright unification but this should not prevent the adoption of a copyright Regulation
governing all aspects which can be regulated while respecting the proportionality and subsidiarity
principles. Whether we are close to the work being started is a political question and depends on the
goodwill of the Union's institutions. But if there is something that can convince them is that we are
ready to start the work. The Wittem Code shows that agreement even on the thorny questions is
possible and that the gap between the common and civil law traditions can be bridged elegantly and
respectfully. The topics have matured over the years both through the Directives and the case law of
the EU courts, and the Union's goals in the field of intellectual property as well. Indeed, in the genesis,
the goals were ending market fragmentation and distortion of competition, improving the
competitiveness of the European economy and protecting EU investment against outside free-riders.
These have remained but new ones have been added, notably increasing the efficiency and simplicity
of intellectual property rights for all involved and reducing costs (e.g. patents). In turn, this will
increase the attractiveness of the EU as an intellectual property legal system in which to operate and
in turn the Union's competitiveness in accordance with one of its founding goals.
Therefore the copyright 1.0 phase has come to an end. The first step (1991-2010) was an initial
“clearing up” or quick fix of important issues that needed to be done. We are now probably entering
the next “generation” of EU copyright, the second phase, that of unification. And beyond codifying
existing law and bridging the gaps between authors' right and copyright systems, we might also need
some changes such as the promised initiative on orphan works.65 We could in this regard usefully
look at proposals beyond our borders such as the Copyright Principles Project led by Pamela
Samuelson to reform US copyright law.66 But in the end, the crucial question will remain whether there
is enough political will to conceive and then give birth to “EU Copyright 2.0”.67 Let us hope that in this
respect, the EU will adopt its host country's national motto68 rather than its current politics …
Partner, Bird & Bird LLP: trevor.cook@twobirds.com.
Associate Professor and Reader in Intellectual Property Law, University of Nottingham.
Estelle.derclaye@nottingham.ac.uk. This article merges and updates two separate contributions by
the authors respectively given at the joint BLACA/BCC Seminar on March 9, 2010, “European
Copyright Law: A Consolidated Approach and Future Possibilities -- Where did Harmonisation Lead
Us and is a Single EU Copyright Act the Way Forwards?” (T. Cook) and at the joint BLACA/IPI
Seminar on October 14, 2010: “An EU copyright code: what and how?” (E. Derclaye).. T. Cook & E.
Derclaye 2010.
I.P.Q. 2011, 3, 259-269
1. Directive 91/250 on the legal protection of computer programs [1991] O.J. L122/42 as codified in Directive 2009/24 on
the legal protection of computer programs [2009] OJ L 111/16.
2. For instance, national procedures and a few substantive points such as the exclusion of must-match features in design
law have not been harmonised.
3. Patent law is the other obvious non-harmonised and non-unified area.
4. Put in place after the elections of June 2009.
5. Commission Paper, “Creative Content in a European Digital Single Market: Challenges for the Future -- A Reflection
Document of DG InfSo and DG Markt” (October 22, 2009) at
http://ec.europa.eu/avpolicy/docs/other_actions/col_2009/reflection_paper.pdf [Accessed July 26, 2011].
6. Entered into force on December 1, 2009.
7. See The Wittem Project -- European Copyright Code (April 2010), at http://www.copyrightcode.eu [Accessed July 26,
2011], discussed in Eleonora Rosati, “The Wittem Group and the European Copyright Code” [2010] J.I.P.L.P. 862 and
in great detail by Jane Ginsburg, “European Copyright Code -- Back to First Principles (with some additional detail)”,
Auteurs & Media (forthcoming 2011), at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1747148 [Accessed July
26, 2011]. See also to a partial extent, A. Sterling, “The Future of Copyright: Approaches for The New Era”, address to
Page7
the British Literary and Artistic Copyright Association, London (March 12, 2009), at
http://www.blaca.org/meeting2009.htm [Accessed July 26, 2011].
8. A further straw in the wind came from the new European Commissioner for the Internal Market, Michel Barnier, who in
January 2010 stated that he is “in favour of an exhaustive and consistent framework for copyright law which will enable
us to meet new challenges such as digitisation”--see written answers to the European Parliament (January 8, 2010)
(IMCO/15/2009). Recently, the Commission has restated that it will examine the feasibility of having an “optional
“unitary” copyright” (whatever that may mean). See Commission, A Single Market for Intellectual Property Rights,
Boosting creativity and innovation to provide economic growth, high quality jobs and first class products and services in
Europe (Brussels: May 24, 2011), COM(2011) 287 final, p.11, at
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/docs/ipr_strategy/COM_2011_287_en.pdf [Accessed July 26, 2011].
However, this is all the document says, so we will need to wait to see what emerges from the Commission's
assessment of such feasibility.
9. “The legal basis could be the new Article 118(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, as introduced
by the Lisbon Reform Treaty …” (fn.49 in original).
10. “The Recasting of Copyright & Related Rights for the Knowledge Economy (2006): ‘Surely, for collecting societies, the
prospect of introducing a Community copyright and abolishing ‘national’ rights is unattractive, to say the least. Territorial
rights are the bread and butter of most existing collecting societies”’ (fn.50 in original); available at
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/docs/studies/etd2005imd195recast_report_2006.pdf [Accessed July 26,
2011].
11. Two notable exceptions are Reto Hilty, “Copyright in the Internal Market” [2004] I.I.C. 760 and Bernt Hugenholtz, who
has written on the topic, primarily in the context of territoriality, in Hugenholtz et al., The Recasting of Copyright &
Related Rights for the Knowledge Economy, Report to the EU Commission, DG Internal Market (IViR 2006), available
at http://www.ivir.nl/publications/other/IViR_Recast_Final_Report_2006.pdf [Accessed July 26, 2011]; Hugenholtz, “The
Last Frontier: Territoriality” in Mireille van Eechoud, P. Bernt Hugenholtz, Stef van Gompel, Lucie Guibault and Natali
Helberger, Harmonizing European Copyright Law -- The Challenges of Better Lawmaking (Kluwer Law International,
2009); and B. Hugenholtz, “Copyright without Frontiers: the Problem of Territoriality in European Copyright Law” in
Estelle Derclaye (ed.), Research Handbook on the Future of EU Copyright (Edward Elgar, 2009). See also the papers
referenced in fn.765 of Hugenholtz, “The Last Frontier”, including Joachim Bornkamm, “Time for a European Copyright
Code?” (2000), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/docs/conference/2000-07-strasbourg-proceedings_en.pdf [Accessed July
26, 2011].
12. Lionel Bently, “The Future of Copyright Law”, Meeting of the AIPPI UK, London, report by J. Watts, April 7, 2010; Hilty,
“Copyright in the Internal Market” [2004] I.I.C. 760, 769 (national rights and a Regulation cannot coexist as this would
create “barely solvable problems”).
13. See the Community Plant Variety Regulation, establishing a Community plant variety right, the Community Trade Mark
Regulation, establishing a Community trade mark, and the Community Design Regulation, establishing both registered
and unregistered Community designs. Each is enforced under a modified Brussels I Regulation jurisdictional regime
enabling relief throughout the EU to be secured in a single proceeding when the defendant is sued under the right in
question in its Member State of residence or domicile, and allowing (except in the case of the Community plant variety
right) the court so seised of the matter to adjudicate also on the validity of such right.
14. Bornkamm, “Time for a European Copyright Code?” (2000), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/docs/conference/2000-07-strasbourg-proceedings_en.pdf [Accessed July
26, 2011] and Hugenholtz, “The Last Frontier” in Harmonizing European Copyright Law, 2009, both discuss the degree
to which, before the TFEU came into effect, the legal basis for the other unitary intellectual property rights could also
have been applied to establish a unitary copyright, and both envisaged difficulties in seeking to apply such legal basis
to establish a EU copyright, especially were it to supplant national rights. One problem which Hugenholtz (in
Harmonizing European Copyright Law, 2009, pp.319-321) eschews is that created by art.295 TEC (now art.345 TFEU)
which provides that “[t]he Treaties shall in no way prejudice the rules in Member States governing the system of
property ownership”. Indeed, the case law and preparatory materials imply that the article is not an obstacle to the
adoption of European intellectual property rights. Thus an EU copyright title could replace national copyright laws. If the
EU is competent, as now TFEU art.118 specifically says, to introduce uniform intellectual property rights and both
national and an EU copyright would not be able to co-exist, the natural conclusion is that the EU title could replace the
national laws.
15. This is not self-evidently the case, as will be seen below.
16. This has led to the absurdity that there are four, cumulative, regimes available to protect designs in an EU Member
State such as the UK, and in others copyright and unfair competition law may also be available to protect designs. It
can perhaps be expected in the longer term that the uptake of such national rights where registered will fall, and that in
some cases the scope to secure such national rights will be withdrawn, but this has not as yet happened anywhere.
17. The existence of a unitary EU unregistered design rights regime in parallel to unregistered design rights protection
regimes at a national level (either by unfair competition law, copyright, or by specific regimes such as that in the UK)
presents considerably fewer difficulties, because design rights are hardly harmonised at all at an international level, and
the right is of very short duration. Even so, the complex and confusing pattern of overlapping design protection in the
EU can hardly be characterised as ideal.
18. Hugenholtz, “The Last Frontier” in Harmonizing European Copyright Law, 2009, fn.773.
Page8
19. As with Directive 2006/116 on the term of protection of copyright and certain related rights [2006] OJ L 372/12.
20. See for example the Database Directive art.14(2). That is not, however, to suggest that legislation that restricted
existing rights would necessarily be inconsistent with art.1 of the First Protocol to the ECHR or art.17 of the Charter of
Fundamental Human Rights of the EU in view of the well-established principle in relation to the former that national
authorities have a wide margin of appreciation in implementing social and economic policies, and their judgment as to
what is in the public or general interest will be respected unless that judgment is manifestly without reasonable
foundation--see James v United Kingdom (1986) 8 E.H.R.R. 123 ECtHR at [46]; Former King of Greece v Greece
(2001) 33 E.H.R.R. 21 ECtHR at [87]; Malama v Greece Unreported March 1, 2001 ECtHR at [45[-[46]; and Denimark
Ltd v United Kingdom (2000) 30 E.H.R.R. CD 144 ECtHR. There is a precedent for some national measures which
have had a greater effect on existing rights than art.14(2) of the Database Directive in the UK Copyright Designs and
Patents Act 1988, which as from 1999 restricted the scope to assert already existing copyright in two dimensional
artistic works against three-dimensional designs that copied such works, before which it had, as from 1989,
considerably limited the damages recoverable for such copying and which before such date had been calculated on a
“conversion” basis as the full value of the infringing articles.
21. Hilty, “Copyright in the Internal Market” [2004] I.I.C. 760, 769, was already of this opinion.
22. Hilty, “Copyright in the Internal Market” [2004] I.I.C. 760, 774. Article 8(2) of Regulation 864/2007 on the law applicable
to non-contractual obligations (Rome II) provides that for infringement of a unitary EU intellectual property right, the law
applicable, to the degree it is not covered by the relevant EU instrument, is that of the country in which the act of
infringement is committed.
23. Van Eechoud et al., Harmonizing European Copyright Law, 2009, p.317.
24. Of course, it all depends, as we mentioned above, how comprehensive the Regulation is. To be most effective, it would
have to deal not only with copyright sensu stricto (i.e. author's rights) but also with neighbouring rights.
25. Simply think of a book which quotes short extracts of works and is meant to be sold all over the Union. Because the law
on exceptions is still largely unharmonised, the strictest law will, in effect, by default govern the publishing contract.
26. In the field of intellectual property law, art.118 replaces TFEU art.352 (ex TEC art.308), which was the basis for
adopting Regulations.
27. The second paragraph deals with language arrangements for European intellectual property rights, In practice, this
paragraph only relates to patent rights.
28. Indeed, some Member States' implementation of Directives have not led to a harmonised state of play, either because
the Directives themselves gave options to the national legislatures (one only needs to think of art.5 of the Infosoc
Directive) or because Member States have badly transposed the Directives and the Commission has not sued them.
29. Hilty, “Copyright in the Internal Market” [2004] I.I.C. 760, 775.
30. See also Lionel Bently, “The Future of Copyright Law”, Meeting of the AIPPI UK, London.
31. Lionel Bently, “The Future of Copyright Law”, Meeting of the AIPPI UK, London
32. Hugenholtz, “Copyright without Frontiers” in Research Handbook on the Future of EU Copyright, 2009, p.18, fn.11 (“for
as long as the territorial nature of copyright and related rights is left intact, harmonisation can achieve relatively little”).
33. A recent example are the vast options left in art.6(4) of the Infosoc Directive which led to great disharmony and
corresponding discrimination between users in different Member States.
34. They may be willing but might not be able owing to the language barriers.
35. See for instance the 2004 database cases, namely The British Horseracing Board Ltd v William Hill Organisation Ltd
(C-203/02) [2004] E.C.R. I-10425, [2005] 1 C.M.L.R. 15; Fixtures Marketing Ltd v Organismos Prognostikon Agonon
Podosfairou (OPAP) (C-444/02) [2004] E.C.R. I-10549; Fixtures Marketing Ltd v Oy Veikkaus AB (C-46/02) [2004]
E.C.R. I-10365, [2005] E.C.D.R. 2; Fixtures Marketing Ltd v Svenska Spel AB (C-338/02) [2004] E.C.R. I-10497, [2005]
E.C.D.R. 4.
36. TEU art.5(3) and (4): “3. Under the principle of subsidiarity, in areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence,
the Union shall act only if and insofar as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the
Member States, either at central level or at regional and local level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of
the proposed action, be better achieved at Union level. The institutions of the Union shall apply the principle of
subsidiarity as laid down in the Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. National
Parliaments shall ensure compliance with that principle in accordance with the procedure set out in that Protocol. 4.
Under the principle of proportionality, the content and form of Union action shall not exceed what is necessary to
achieve the objectives of the Treaties. The institutions of the Union shall apply the principle of proportionality as laid
down in the Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality.”
37. D. Chalmers, G. Davies and G. Monti, European Union Law, 2nd edn (Cambridge University Press, 2010), p.363.
38. D. Chalmers, G. Davies and G. Monti, European Union Law, 2nd edn (Cambridge University Press, 2010), p.364.
Page9
39. D. Chalmers, G. Davies and G. Monti, European Union Law, 2nd edn (Cambridge University Press, 2010), p.364.
40. Netherlands v Council and European Parliament (C-377/98) [2001] E.C.R. I-7079; [2001] 3 C.M.L.R. 49. The case law
also suggests that it is enough that the instrument (Directive, Regulation) includes a reference to the principle, or that
there is no reference but on the face of it, the instrument seems to comply. See Chalmers et al., European Union Law,
2010, pp.364-365.
41. Directive 98/44 on the legal protection of biotechnological inventions [1998] OJ L 213/13.
42. Netherlands v Council and European Parliament [2001] E.C.R. I-7079; [2001] 3 C.M.L.R. 49 at [32].
43. On proportionality see, e.g., Chalmers et al., European Union Law, 2010, pp.367 et seq. On the two principles, see also
van Eechoud et al., Harmonizing European Copyright Law, 2009, pp.19-22.
44. Van Eechoud et al., Harmonizing European Copyright Law, 2009, p.22 and cases cited.
45. Van Eechoud et al., Harmonizing European Copyright Law, 2009, pp.20 and 22 and cases cited.
46. Collecting societies can also be seen as preserving and promoting cultural diversity. See Hugenholtz, “Copyright
without Frontiers” in Research Handbook on the Future of EU Copyright, 2009, p.19 (“By protecting and promoting local
authors and performers, collecting societies play an important role in fostering ‘cultural diversity’ in the European
Union”).
47. Hugenholtz, “Copyright without Frontiers” in Research Handbook on the Future of EU Copyright, 2009; W. Kingston,
“Intellectual Property in the Lisbon Treaty” [2008] E.I.P.R. 439, 443 is against a Regulation dealing with all aspects of
copyright and related rights, because it will reduce diversity.
48. See Commission Decision C(2008) 3435 final of July 6, 2008, against which an appeal is pending in CISAC (T-442/08).
49. See, however, the project instigated by the Commission itself, via two recommendations and an action plan, to provide
a Common Frame of Reference for European contract law, which is well summarised by Andrew Vogeler at
http://jurist.org/dateline/2010/07/germany-european-contract-law-harmonization.php [Accessed July 26, 2011] and is
now entrusted to the Joint Network on European Private Law, http://www.copecl.org/ [Accessed July 26, 2011]. See
also the project of the European Group on Tort Law (http://www.egtl.org/ [Accessed July 26, 2011]), whose ultimate aim
is to codify European tort law and that of the Study Group on a European Civil Code who has a similar aim in the
broader field of civil law, http://www.sgecc.net/pages/en/introduction/index.introduction.htm [Accessed July 26, 2011].
All these groups are mainly composed of academics.
50. Van Eechoud et al., Harmonizing European Copyright Law, 2009, p.21.
51. For example, can a perfume be a copyright work, as the Dutch Supreme Court found in Kecofa BV v Lancome Parfums
[2006] E.C.D.R. 26, in contrast to the French Cour de Cassation, which found it could not in Bsiri-Barbir v Haarmann &
Reimer [2006] E.C.D.R. 28. Note that it has been suggested that the effect of the decision of the CJEU in Infopaq
International A/S v Dansk Dagblades Forening (C-5/08) [2009] E.C.R. I-6569; [2009] E.C.D.R. 16 is that it is within the
competence of the CJEU to interpret what constitutes a copyright work, despite there having been no ostensible
attempt to harmonise its meaning in the Copyright in the Information Society Directive--see Christian Handig, “Is the
Term ‘Work’ of the CDPA 1988 in line with the European Directives?” [2010] E.I.P.R. 53.
52. Article 2(7) of Berne permits considerable latitude in this respect, and such latitude is expressly preserved by art.17 of
the Designs Directive. As a result, the degree of copyright protection available for designs is highly variable throughout
the EU--see Estelle Derclaye, “Are Fashion Designers Better Protected in Continental Europe than in the United
Kingdom? A Comparative Analysis of the Recent Case Law in France, Italy and the United Kingdom” [2010] Journal of
World Intellectual Property 315.
53. The Computer Program and Database Directives address this issue for computer programs and databases
respectively, and the Term Directive does so for photographs (albeit allowing Member States also to protect
photographs which do not meet such criteria, by what in effect are related rights) but apart from these, there has been
no explicit further harmonisation of the concept. Despite this, the CJEU assumed in Infopaq [2009] E.C.R. I-6569;
[2009] E.C.D.R. 16 that the “author's own intellectual creation” test applied also to copyright works other than computer
programs and databases.
54. So far, after more than 20 years of legislative activity, this issue has only been harmonised in the EU for copyright in
computer programs. An attempt to do so in respect of copyright in databases was abandoned, and for copyright in films,
the “harmonisation” allows Member States considerable latitude in the types of person who can be designated as an
author--see the Commission's Report on the question of authorship of cinematographic or audiovisual works in the
Community, COM(2002) 691 final (December 6, 2002).
55. This is not an issue in the regimes for existing unitary EU intellectual property rights, where there is more scope for
effective freedom of contract as between commercial entities than there is in contracts as between authors and
publishers in copyright, but as to which different Member States provide different types of protection for authors.
Reflecting the absence of harmonisation of contract law in the EU, the Community Designs Regulation for example
provides at art.27(1) that “a Community design as an object of property shall be dealt with in its entirety, and for the
whole area of the Community, as a national design right of the Member State in which: (a) the holder has his seat or his
domicile on the relevant date; or (b) where point (a) does not apply, the holder has an establishment on the relevant
date”. Hugenholtz, who has also studied such contracts (see Lucie Guibault et al., Study on the Conditions Applicable
Page10
to Contracts Relating to Intellectual Property in the European Union (IViR 2002), at
http://www.ivir.nl/publications/other/contracts.html [Accessed July 26, 2011]) has, however, suggested, in “The Last
Frontier” in Harmonizing European Copyright Law, 2009, that copyright contract law, along with moral rights and the
governance of collective rights management societies, need not, on grounds or proportionality and subsidiarity, be
harmonised.
56. This is not just a question of what sort of acts constitute what English law characterises as “joint tortfeasance”, and
which is a general legal concept under English law, not limited to copyright or even intellectual property rights. These
days its highest profile is in the issue of ISP liability, and the relationship between ISPs and their customers, as to which
the CJEU held in Promusicae v Telefónica (C-275/06) [2008] E.C.R. I-271; [2008] E.C.D.R. 10 that the specific balance
to be struck between the protection of intellectual property and the protection of privacy was a matter for national law.
The nature of such balance, as demonstrated by the controversy over Amendment 138 to the “Telecoms package” in
2009, which became art.1(3a) of Directive 2002/21 on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications
networks and services (Framework Directive), as amended by Directive 2009/140, remains highly controversial.
57. Under the TFEU, there is a sounder basis than previously to legislate as to criminal penalties for intellectual property
infringement, and drafts of Directives aimed at harmonising the use of criminal penalties for intellectual property
infringement have been in existence for some time. The expected further initiatives at an EU level as to this promise,
however, to be controversial.
58. For this, we refer to Rosati, “The Wittem Group and the European Copyright Code” [2010] J.I.P.L.P. 862 and Jane
Ginsburg, “European Copyright Code -- Back to First Principles (with some additional detail)”, Auteurs & Media
(forthcoming 2011), at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1747148 [Accessed July 26, 2011].
59. Rosati, “The Wittem Group and the European Copyright Code” [2010] J.I.P.L.P. 862, 866-867 also thinks that there is a
“sensible balance between a US style open-ended system of limitations and a civil law style exhaustive enumeration”
and that the exceptions are worthy of praise.
60. See above fn.51 re perfumes. A recent ruling of the CJEU in fact has perhaps harmonised the law in favour of an open
system and done away with the categories still existing in UK and Irish copyright law. See Bezpe%24cnostn softwarová
asociace -- Svaz softwarové ochrany v Ministerstvo kultury (C-393/09) December 22, 2010, at http://curia.europa.eu/
[Accessed July 26, 2011] and the discussion at
http://ipkitten.blogspot.com/2011/01/lionel-bezpecnostni-softwarova-asociace.html [Accessed July 26, 2011]
61. Rosati, “The Wittem Group and the European Copyright Code” [2010] J.I.P.L.P. 862, 864.
62. Correspondence with Lionel Bently, one of the members of the Wittem Group, on file with the authors.
63. Rosati, “The Wittem Group and the European Copyright Code” [2010] J.I.P.L.P. 862, 864.
64. See Trevor Cook, “Exhaustion -- A Casualty of the Borderless Digital Era” in Lionel Bentley, Uma Suthersanenan and
Paul Torremans (eds), Global Copyright: Three Hundred Years Since the Statute of Anne, from 1709 to Cyberspace
(Edward Elgar, 2010).
65. A Directive proposal was announced for November 2010 and was adopted in May 2011. See COM (2011) 289 Final,
Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on certain permitted uses of orphan works,
available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/docs/orphan-works/proposal_en.pdf [Accessed July 26, 2011]
66. See http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/bclt_CPP.pdf [Accessed July 26, 2011].
67. It does not seem to be for the very near future, as the Commission's “Creative Content” paper itself states that “[f]urther
reflection on the future of European rights management would therefore have to precede the introduction of a
Community copyright title”.
68. Belgium's motto is “L'union fait la force” or “Eendracht maakt macht” (unity makes strength).
© 2012 Sweet & Maxwell and its Contributors
Page11
